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Abstract
 
In order to evaluate the effects of local institutional setting the project
 
titled,“Walawe Left Bank Upgrading and Extension Project”in Sri Lanka,
funded by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation was selected for
 
the study. The project has commence on two phases;phase one to upgrade
 
the existing,but now degraded irrigation facilities in the northern half of the
 
Walawe Left Bank(WLB);and phase two to develop new area for cultiva-
tion and settlements in the southern half of the WLB area. The irrigation
 
system has operated effectively in the existing areas but with improvements
 
in irrigation efficiency much below design. The institutional environment in
 
the area,both formal and informal,has not been fully compatible with the
 
assumptions of the project design. Inefficiencies in the formal institutions
 
and relaxations of informal institutions have driven encroachment of land
 
resources and inefficient water usage in the area, threatening the sus-
tainability of the project. Provision of irrigation facilities at no cost to
 
farmers, combined with limited farmer participation in designing, has
 
resulted in low levels of system ownership. In turn,this has contributed to
 
widespread damage to structures and water wastage. The development of
 
the extension area seemed unwarranted until the institutional set up is
 
strengthened to address the needs of the locale.
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?．Introduction
 
In recent years,a number of studies have focused on measuring the
 
impact of institutions on socio economic development. However, the
 
affect of these institutions on effectiveness of foreign aid utilization is not
 
much studied. Findings of these studies are important as they suggest
 
that institutional quality may trigger economic under development.
However,interpretation and policy implications of these findings depends
 
on understanding the specific channels through which institutions affect
 
growth, and the reasons for institutional change or the lack thereof.
However, it is important to pay attention to how changes in resource
 
endowments can cause individuals to change their economic behavior
 
within a given institutional context and potentially cause the institution
 
itself to change in the longer run in developing countries.
Institutions are generally defined as“constraints that human beings
 
impose on themselves”(North,1990:3). Other scholars include organ-
izational entities,procedural devices,and regulatory frameworks in their
 
definition of institutions(Williamson,2000:595). Therefore for this study
 
institutions will be defined as “a set of rules, norms and constraints
 
including their enforcement arrangements,which guide behavior, inten-
tions,norms and beliefs through human incentives in pursuing a goal”.
The types of institutions covers in the literature?,ranges from infor-
mal access and conservation rules to more formalized community sys-
tems and laws. Most of the reviewed studies(McMillan and Woodruff,
2001:637-658;Jutting,2003:26;Platteau,2002:1-54)look at a particular
 
institution and its particular impact on development outcomes. Informal
 
local institutions are not only explicitly taken into account but are found
 
to be a key element in understanding the management of natural
佐賀大学経済論集 第40巻第３号
１ The quality of the institutions is not prior defined as in most of the cross
 
sectional studies.
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resources,market development and conflict management. In the area of
 
natural resource management,informal institutions define the access to
 
common goods and the rights of use. The studies come to the conclusion
 
that they are available at low cost and are quite flexible though some
 
studies pointed out that the rules of access and use defined by informal
 
institutions might not prevent a continuing degradation of resources.
Informal institutions in most cases have a positive effect on market
 
development. They do so by contributing to lowering transaction costs
 
and reducing risks,thereby making market transaction possible at all in
 
an environment characterized by huge information asymmetries.
The literature(Dollar and Levin,2005:1-25;Isham and Kaufmann,
1999:149-184;Isham et al.,1997:219-242;Kaufmann and Wang,1995:751
-765;Knack,2001:310-329;Boone,1995:289-321;Alesina et al.,2000:33
-63;Shirley et al.,2004:1-48)on the impact of institutions on development
 
outcomes has shown that the institutional environment can either pro-
mote development outcomes or be an obstacle to it. It also emerges that
 
this depends not only on the“quality”of the institutional setting in itself
 
but also on factors like the local setting or the interests and behaviour of
 
the actors involved.
The present study focuses on the role of formal local institutions in
 
irrigation resource endowments through Japanese aid,in Sri Lanka. First
 
it attempts to assess the overall benefits of the project. Then the study
 
focuses on two main informal institutions, namely land management
 
systems and water management systems existing in the area,and their
 
interrelationship with the formal institution involved in project implemen-
tation. Specifically concerned formal institutions are the Mahaweli
 
Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL), The Consultancy Company and the
 
Farmer organizations. Finally how these interrelationships have affected
 
the realization of the expected benefits form the project and its sus-
tainability will be reviewed. Viewing development, as a mere set of
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technical engineering endeavors,is impractical as irrigation management
 
is an important a social issue. The outcomes of the project are governed
 
by the evolution of the behavior and choices of the different actors
 
concerned,in which their interests,mindsets and strategies are embedded.
It is important to pays attention to how changes in resource endowments
 
change behavior within a given institutional context. Such a focus is
 
particularly relevant when thinking about institutions in developing
 
countries,since development,by definition,is about change.
Walawe Left Bank Upgrading and Extension Project 
The project?titled, “Walawe Left Bank Upgrading and Extension
 
Project(WLBP)”was launched in 1997 with loan assistance from Japan
 
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), to further expand and up-
grade the irrigation infrastructure in the Walawe River Basin. The
 
project was designed in two phases;rehabilitate and upgrade the existing
 
irrigation areas under Phase I, and further development of additional
 
5,200 ha of the down stream of Left Bank in Phase II which is identified
 
by the project as the“Extension Area”The estimated cost for completion
 
of the project was US$143.5 million (1995 prices), which included
 
US$33.5 million for the rehabilitation and upgrading of the Existing Area
 
and US$110 million for the development of the Extension Area. Phase I
 
of this project has been completed,providing new irrigation facilities to
 
an additional 1,600 ha of land and improved irrigation facilities(concrete
 
lining of all canals)to about 2,400 ha of existing irrigated areas in the
 
Kriibbanwewa and Sooriyawewa blocks (see Figure 1). At present,
２ Development of the Walawe basin, a large-scale irrigation, resettlement and
 
rural development project was initiated in the 1950s as some of the first in the wave
 
of agrarian settlements of the post-World War II period in Sri Lanka. The project
 
was conducted in several stages,where the Asian Development Bank funded the
 
initial phase.
― ―32
佐賀大学経済論集 第40巻第３号
LBMC irrigates a total of 6,000 ha of land. The Extension area to be
 
developed under Phase II of the project is presently rain fed or under
 
traditional slash and burn cultivation,which is called‘chena’cultivation.
With the completion of the project,the total area under irrigation would
 
increase to 11,200 ha in the WLB.
Figure 1  Udawalawe Irrigation Area
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Project implementation and management involves four main organi-
zations. First, Japan Bank for international cooperation (JBIC) has
 
provided a concessional loan in financing the Walawe Left Bank Upgrad-
ing and Rehabilitation Project. Second,apart from the responsibilities on
 
project planning and implementation activities,Mahaweli Authority of
 
Sri Lanka(MASL)is responsible for water releases from the Udawalawe
 
reservoir and administration of the land under the irrigation scheme.
Third,the Nippon Koei Engineering Consultancies(PVT)Ltd.was hired
 
as the consultancy company by the MASL. They are responsible on
 
overseeing planning,and implementation activities. Finally the farmer
 
organizations manage the field canal system and represent the farmers
 
towards the MASL.
?．Perceptions of the Villagers’on the Project
 
Outcomes
 
The overall objective of the Walawe Left Bank Irrigation Upgrading
 
and Rehabilitation Project (WLBP)is to expand the command area of
 
the Udawalawe reservoir. It consists of rehabilitations of the existing
 
area, which comprise of the study area, and expanding the irrigation
 
resources to the extension area. In order to achieve project objectives,
the efficiency of irrigation water usage in the system must be improved.
The same quantity of irrigation water that has been utilized so far only
 
by the existing areas,must be used by both existing and extension areas
 
after the completion of the project. Thus the farmers in the existing
 
cultivation areas,who have experience abundant irrigation water until
 
now,must entail limitations in water use. Although the farmers in the
 
area were aware of the extension of the projects,Table 1 depicts that
 
none of them were aware or expected a limitation of available irrigation
 
water in order to supply water to the extended areas. Almost all the
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farmers(97 percent)anticipated better and timely availability of irriga-
tion water, while 62 percent of the farmers expected a better water
 
distribution in the distributary and field canals. Although only 12 percent
 
of the farmers expected to increase the cultivable land,many of them(67
 
percent) expected an increase of productivity. Thus it is clear that
 
farmers’expectations are mainly on improvement of water availability,
and distribution within the existing system.
?．Relationship of Informal Institutions
 
with WLBP
 
The study focuses mainly on two informal institutions in the locale;
land tenure systems and water management systems,as the WLBP deals
 
directly with these two aspects. The success of the project,along with its
 
sustainability,depends on how effective the final beneficiaries are able to
 
manage the infrastructure newly developed and bestowed. Therefore,the
 
project objectives, project design as well as the assumptions made in
 
order to prepare the present project design must be compatible with the
 
prevailing informal land and water management systems. Also these
 
prevailing informal institutions would influence the farmers’behavior in
 
utilization of the new resources. Willingness of the villagers in the locale
 
Increase in cropping intensity
 
Increase in crop yield per land plot
 
Reduction in farmer conflicts over water issues
 
Less time involvement for canal maintenance
 
Reduce maintenance cost (currency,labour,etc.)
Better water distribution
 
Increase of cultivable land
 
Timely availability of irrigation water
 
Better availability of irrigation water
 
9
 
67
 
62
 
45
 
54
 
62
 
12
 
97
 
97
 
Percentage Perception
 
Table 1  Farmer Perceptions on Project Benefits
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to forgo external benefits and costs,as well as their inclination towards
 
achieving of project objectives also depends on the types and quality of
 
the informal institutions prevails.
a.Land Tenure System 
The patterns of land ownership and tenure in the cascade systems
 
have been influenced by the colonial policies?and land related regulations
 
and acts during the post independent period. The people in the system
 
have Swarnabhumi, Jayabhumi titles, Land Development Ordinance
(LDO)permits or are encroachers on crown lands?.
As division of land among progeny is not allowed in the resettlement
 
schemes, the second generation,who are anticipating being involved in
 
agriculture,has only two choices. One is to cultivate their father’s land.
If the land holder has only one child, or only one child interested in
 
agriculture, he can name him as the successor and the land permit
 
provisions ensure the cultivating rights of the child. But if there are more
３ The land ownership pattern in the area differs from that in many old tank
 
villages where land often belongs to the category of paraveni (lands in active use
 
when the cadastral survey was done in 1900 by the British;these lands were treated
 
as private property from ancestral times). Absence of this type of land in Walawe
 
cascade systems substantiates the fact that there were no communities occupying
 
lands in this part of the country during the early parts of the British administration
(Jayakody et al.,2005:5).
４ A land grant is given to the owner of a land permit after one year,for an up land
 
and after 3 years for a paddy lands. Two types of land grants are there. One is the
‘Swarnabhoomy’deeds,which are issued under the Mahaweli ordinance no.22 by the
 
Director General of MASL. The other one is ‘Jayabhoomy’deeds, issued under
 
section 19.4 of Land Development Ordinance by the President of Sri Lanka. Apart
 
from the cultivation rights given by the land permit,consumption rights of many
 
resources including forests,except the mineral resources,in the land is given to the
 
owner. The owner can sell the land only under the permission of the RPM,with the
 
preparation of the deed by an authorized Notary-of-law. This land grant can be
 
used as collateral for many banks in taking loans.
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than one descendant, they have to either share the land,compromising
 
having the legal rights,or they have to get a lease or encroach land for
 
cultivation,which is the second available choice. In sharing the land by
 
the descendants, since the land area cultivated is small, it only permits
 
subsistence farming,with little excess yield for the market. Thus leasing
 
land and encroaching land for cultivation pose an attractive option for
 
this new farming community.
Land Encroachment:Cultivating land without legal rights in the study
 
area is not uncommon. Mainly,two groups of land encroachers can be
 
identified. One is the group of farmers practicing encroached farming
 
because they do not have access to other legal land. The other group of
 
farmers practice encroached farming, in order to increase their land
 
extent,in addition to their legally received land. As shown in Table 2,
land encroachments of paddy lands are greater than upland,and most of
 
them (68 percent)are land less farmers.
The encroachers always attempt to get the best land available for
 
cultivation. Thus their most interested area is the reservation area of the
‘Kiriibbanwawe’tank,where abundant water is available for cultivation?.
This situation has been controlled to some extend in the study area,
５ Seepage water contributes to the water availability and besides that,water is
 
stolen (Buysse,2002:8).
(Percentage)
16 84 Total encroached
 
3 3 Encroached land leased in
 
3 3 Encroached land leased out
 
7 68 Encroachers without own land
 
3 10 Encroachers with own land
 
Upland Paddy land
 
Table 2  Distributions of Encroached Lands
 
Category
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mainly through the involvement of farmer organizations. These encroa-
ched farmers usually do not like to shift from their land,because they
 
perceive that the any land option available at another place is substan-
dard to his current possession. Hence, the authorities are facing a
 
problem in relocating encroached farmers to other suitable land plots,in
 
order to develop the land according to a specified plan. This problem is
 
magnified by steps taken by the authorities to regulate the encroachment
 
problems. Through this regularization programme, farmers who had
 
been cultivating their encroached lands for more than a stipulated period
 
of time are permitted to apply for a land permit,and thereby given the
 
ownership of the cultivated land for themselves. Although this is a step
 
taken as a solution to the encroachment problem,on the other hand it act
 
as a positive incentive for the farmers to go on encroaching lands,with
 
the prospect of obtaining the legal ownership in the future. Therefore,the
 
steps taken as a solution have been acting as a boomerang in intensifying
 
the problem in the area. Therefore the best solution lies at controlling the
 
encroachment before it actually takes place. In the study area,this has
 
been successful in concerning the reservation areas of the tank,where the
 
farmer organization has acted as a controlling mechanism in steering up
 
oppositions for such activities in the study area. But the same force does
 
not act accordingly when the encroached lands lies elsewhere. This is
 
because the farmer community in the area does not see encroachment
 
itself as a problem to the system,only their perceived threat to the tank
 
if the reservation areas are been cultivated. They see the encroached
 
farmers as their peers,where some of themselves are practicing it,and
 
view it as a practical solution for a landless farmer to be engaged in.
Renting and Lending of Land:As has been discussed under chapter five,
the land rights given by the land permit or grant,does not allow the land
 
holder to lease or rent out any land for more than one year period. But
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in the informal setting,two land exchange systems were widely practiced
 
in the study area. These two systems are called ‘Ande’and ‘Badde’
systems. There are not much difference between the exchange provisions
 
of the two systems, but bade system indicates a long term land lease,
where as‘Ande’system is on average only for a 2 to 3 year period. The
 
tenants have the secure access to the field,but provide a stipulated yield
 
as rent to the absentee land owner, in this case the land permit holder.
The practice of these two land renting systems in the study area is shown
 
in Table 3. In the ‘Ande’system, either the land owner or the tenant
 
farmer provides all the seed and fertilizer requirements in the study area?.
The person holding a land permit has access to seed and fertilizer at
 
subsidized prices. Therefore the general practice in the area is for the
 
land permit holder to buy the fertilizer and seed at the subsidized price
 
and provide it to the cultivator. The yield share varies with each and
 
every agreement with the two parties,but the average is around 750 kg
 
per acre per season. This amount usually does not change upon yield. In
 
the‘Badde’system,the land owner shares less responsibility as all seed
 
and fertilizer is provided by the cultivator himself. The yield share in this
 
system also varies according to the agreement,but the average is 700 kg
６ This differs with the most common land tenure practices in the country where,
the land lord and tenant share 50:50 in seeds and fertilizer inputs and the land lord
 
gets 25 percent of the total harvest,as been provided by the paddy land act in 1958.
Table 3 Provisions of Land Exchange Systems
 
Seed  Fertilizer  Yield share  Seed  Fertilizer
 Yield share
 
Ande  Badde
 
Rest of the Yield
 
701.1 kg/ac
 
100
－
100
－
Rest of the Yield
 
758.8kg/ac
 
100
(6.6)
100
(11.3)
100
(6.6)
100
(11.3)
Cultivator
 
Land owner
(Percentage)
Note:The value in parenthesis shows the percentage of farmers.
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per acre per season to the land owner.
The farmers who cultivate land under“Ande”and“Badde”systems
 
can be identified as follows:One group consists of the first generation
 
land holders,whose land is now cultivated by their second generation.
The land holder has rented the land to his children, to cultivate and
 
receives only the rent,for his subsistence?. In this case,if more than one
 
cultivator is sharing the land, in the case the land holder has many
 
children, the children divides the rest in equal shares. This is mainly
 
subsistence paddy farming. The other group of cultivators is the large
 
scale market oriented cultivators. Apart from cultivating their own land,
they rent out nearby lands,in order to increase their scale of cultivated
 
land,thus increase the profit. This implies emergence of capitalist class
 
in the study area of the country in the recent past. The difference of these
 
two groups is depicted by looking at the productivity of land in the study
 
area (refer Figure 2).
Respondents who receive less than 1000 kg per season consist mainly
 
of the farmers who have leased their irrigated land and receive an agreed
 
amount of paddy,or who are cultivating a shared land of their parents or
 
close relatives with siblings. Thus their seasonal yield is lesser and does
 
not vary. Farmers with larger yields(greater than 7500 kg)are mostly
 
farmers who have taken others lands on lease. Their yield is greater due
 
to large land area cultivated,and varies little seasonally. These large
 
scale farmers have the means and resources to face common agricultural
 
problems,such as water scarcity or insect damages. But the respondents
 
with intermediate yield often are owner farmers, experiencing a yield
 
change according to the season,with a comparatively higher yield in the
 
Maha season. Their yields are highly susceptible to water scarcity as well
 
as other agricultural problems.
７ Renting out to own family members result lower rent (less than average)
compared to renting out to non family members.
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In addition to tenurial patterns referred to above,other land tenure
 
systems exist in the area are mortgaging and renting. These however are
 
limited to marginal farm households in the system. The households resort
 
to land mortgaging when a need for a large sum of money arises at a time
 
for an unforeseen purpose. The land is cultivated by the mortgagor until
 
he recovers his loan with a high interest, normally greater than 100
 
percent per year. If the farmer cannot repay the loan and the interest
 
before the agreement is expired,ownership shifts to the mortgagor. Land
 
mortgaging is practiced mainly for paddy lands. The land renting is
 
practiced for uplands such as coconut lands,where the owner lease out
 
the land because of a financial requirement. Here, the renter uses the
 
land for a specific period,depending on the amount of money sought in
 
the form of loans. The land ownership reverts to the original owner after
 
the termination of the agreement,unless it has been extended for further
 
loans.
These various land tenure systems exists as survival strategies of the
 
farmer community. Although in one aspect it can be defined as highly
 
exploitative,given the choices, the farmers perceive these as their best
(Including Both Seasons in 2005/06)
Figure 2  Total Paddy Productions in the Area
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options available. This also allows the farmers to manipulate the existing
 
land regulations and mobilize the land resources, so as more efficient
 
farmers have access to large land extents to cultivate,thus improve the
 
productivity. But it could adversely affect the livelihood of the poorer
 
farmers, leading to income inequalities and incidence of poverty in the
 
community.
Although there is no significant change in the pattern of renting and
 
lending of land in the area, the incident of land encroaching has been
 
changed significantly. Even though due to the involvement of farmer
 
organizations,land encroachment in the reservation areas of the tank has
 
been controlled significantly,an unanticipated massive influx of encroa-
chers has migrated to the area in anticipation of future land grants. The
 
delays in the progress of the project in allocating and regulating land
 
resources to its proper uses are a main reason for this phenomenon.
b.Water Management System 
The institution known as“Vel Vidane”system?was absent in these
 
tank systems even in the past. In this area, farmers have experienced
 
cultivation committee systems and various other reforms successively
 
introduced by the government in the last half a century. Involvement of
 
farmers and farmer representatives in system operation and maintenance
 
in these systems is due to the fact that these systems have come into
 
operation after the abolition of “Vel Vidane”system. In such system,
farmers know only about the MASL personnel and farmer representa-
８ Under the Vel Vidane system,responsibilities in system operation and mainte-
nance were implemented by the Vel Vidane on the decisions made at the cultivation
 
meeting. In the past,payments were made to Vel Vidane for activities like system
 
operation and maintenance and water management through implementation of
 
rotations during dry periods. The payment made to Vidane or farmer representa-
tive is called“uvandiram”. In the past farmers had to pay¼ of a bushel(6 kg)per
 
acre as“uvandiram”.
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tives handling these responsibilities. The Vel Vidane system has now
 
been replaced with farmer organizations who take lead in routine mainte-
nance of the irrigation systems and their operations.
The responsibilities vested upon farmer organizations,extracted by
 
interviews of farmer leaders are summarized in Table 4. It shows that
 
although the farmer organizations are responsible of distributary(D)and
 
field canals?,they do not possess any legal rights to the canals or irriga-
tion water they utilize. It is remarkable that farmer leaders perceive that
 
they do not have responsibility in future rehabilitations of the resources.
The responsibility of water management in the filed level of the
 
resettlement area lies with the farmer organizations. Field canal farmer
 
organizations as well as distributary canal farmer organizations are
 
involved in many activities, in managing water distribution at the field
９ The canals starting directly form the left bank main canal is referred as dis-
tributary canal or D canal,while the canals starting from the D canals are referred
 
to as field canals. Field canals take the water to each and every field.
Right to make profit
 
Right to make contracts and raise additional revenue
 
Legal rights for canals
 
Responsibility to future rehabilitations
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
Partial
 
No
 
Table 4 Responsibilities Vested with Farmer Organizations
 
Agreements and Functions  Occurrence
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
No
 
Partial
 
Partial
 
Yes
 
Levy fines
 
Yes
 
No
 
FO as legal entity
 
FO leaders select by farmers
 
legal water rights at FC level
 
Authority to make rules and sanctions
 
Authority to make O&M plans and budgets
 
Authority to set water charges
 
Maximum sanction available to FO
 
Control over D and field canals
 
Control over overall discharge and intake
 
Note:Partial indicates that the MASL has the final decision making power
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level. Table 5 illustrated the activities carried out by the five distributary
 
canal farmer organizations, from here onwards referred to as farmer
 
organizations, existing in the study area and the participation of the
 
members in these activities. The most common practice in the area is
 
cleaning the canal beds using labour. Every farmer organization carries
 
out this function as their main responsibility in maintenance of the canals.
It is carried out twice a season,once prior to the commencement of the
 
season, and the second towards the mid season. Two distinguished
 
methods can be seen in carrying out the work. Some farmer organiza-
tions decides on a certain date and every member of the organization
 
gather and do the cleaning of the whole canal at the same time using
 
shared labour. The second method is the farmer organization distributed
 
equal lengths of the canal among its members and decides on a deadline
 
for the work to be carried out. The members clean their responsible area,
at different times most suited to their schedules. For the mid seasonal
 
cleaning most of the farmer organizations adopt the second method,given
 
the reason that it is difficult to gather farmers as their opportunity cost
 
of labour rises in the mid of the season as they are already involved in
 
cultivation practices and are unwilling to participate in labour sharing
 
activities at that point of time. Although 100 percent of the farmer
 
members engaged in cleaning of the canal bed pre-seasonally only 40
 
percent of the farmers were involved in mid seasonal cleaning,whereas
 
only 32 percent met the dead line. Although this is not a severe problem
 
for the maintenance of the canal,it poses an acute problem regarding
 
the water distribution of the canals. When the canal beds are not clean
 
and has silted and debris accumulated,the water flow of the canal looses
 
the stipulated flow rate and water pressure required to carry water
 
towards the tail end. The water logged condition benefits the farmers
 
with the adjacent fields,where they can obtain irrigation water for a
 
longer period of time. Thus the farmers at the head and middle of the
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canal do not face any negative effect through this; rather they are
 
benefited from the uncleaned canals. The possible externality lies for the
 
farmers cultivating at the tail end of the canal,who do not get adequate
 
irrigation water,when the flow rates and water pressure at the head of
 
the canal is reduced.
Furthermore by looking at Table 5, it is clear of the perception of
 
farmer organizations that their responsibility of maintaining irrigation
 
canals lies in cleaning of the canals through labour participation.
Although all the farmer organizations are involved in collecting a fee,
mainly as a membership fee,for a farmer organizational fund there is no
 
specific fund allocation for future rehabilitations of the irrigation canals.
In their mind-set,any rehabilitation or maintenance activity with pecuni-
ary requirements is out of their scope, thus a responsibility of the offi-
cials.
Table 6,relating to complaints about water scarcity,shows that the
 
phenomenon increases towards the tail end of the canal. Since in the
 
farmers’perception, the incident has increased after the upgrading and
 
rehabilitation project of the left bank, they see this as an error at the
 
Collection of funds for future canal rehabilitations  0
(Percentage)
Table 5 Farmer Participation in Activities Carried Out by the Distributary Canal Farmer Organizations
 
Activity  Participation
 
100
 
11
 
7
 
17
 
48
 
11
 
7
 
2
 
100
 
Contribution of labour for canal maintenance
 
Coordinating distribution of water among field canals
 
Educating farmers about efficient water use and management
 
Coordination among head and tail end water users
 
Harmonizing disputes among farmers on water issues
 
Contributions on decision making in seasonal meetings
 
Prepare schedules for water rotations
 
Levy sanctions for scandalous water resources
 
Collection of a fee for farmer organization
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project planning. While the farmers agree that the situation intensifies
 
because of the uncleaned head and middle canals, in their opinion the
 
major problem lies in the design of the canals itself. The canal design
 
exhibits three main physical characteristics: the dimensional changes
 
throughout the canal, smaller outlet size and the special square shaped
 
cross sectional view. Although all these three factors are interrelated in
 
serving their purpose,they will be discussed separately in order to explain
 
the farmer perceptions about them.
The dimensions of the canal in height,width and cross sectional area
 
change towards the tail end of the canal making the canal smaller. It can
 
be observed that,the canal is two or three times larger at the head end
 
compared to the tail end. The farmers presume that the water does not
 
flow adequately to the tail end of the canal because of its inadequate
 
capacity. But the actual technical reason lying behind the reduction of the
 
canal size is to maintain the required water pressure for proper irrigation
 
towards the tail end,with a minimum utilization of water. If the canal is
 
build at the same width and same height, in order to maintain a good
 
water pressure for effective irrigation increases. But by reducing the
 
width and heights of the canal, thereby the cross sectional area, the
 
amount of water required to flow in a given period of time in order to
 
maintain the water pressure of the canal reduces. This enables to use the
 
irrigation water more efficiently. But for this purpose the water should
 
flow through out the canal without any blockage. But the farmers in the
 
study area are not willing to accept this factor,as in their experience the
 
water flow was adequate before the rehabilitations were done,and there
 
had been no forewarning of water limitations for them after rehabilita-
tions.
The second factor is the size of the outlets of the field canal at the
 
fields. The size of the outlet designed initially has been 6 inches in
 
diameter. The initial design of the canal has been aimed at irrigating the
― ―46
佐賀大学経済論集 第40巻第３号
land in a rotational calendar where water is to be issued to a field one in
 
6 days. But the Reddish Brown Earth(RBE)soil existing in the area has
 
a low water retention capacity. According to the technical engineer
 
responsible for the area,RBE soil can hold water adequately and effec-
tively for paddy production for a maximum period of 4 to 5 days. Thus
 
in a 6 days rotational period,the paddy plant is subjected to a water stress
 
resulting lower yields towards the end of the season. Thus for the project
 
design, reducing the rotational period, optimally to a four to five day
 
rotational calendar would have been ideal. But the farmers,who had been
 
used to a continuous water flow to the canals, had not been ready to
 
compromise it. Thus,they had demanded the block office for a continu-
ous water flow in the canals. As a solution for the high water utilization
 
in the fields,they had suggested to reduce the outlet size from six inches
 
of diameter to 3 inches of diameter. At first,the farmer organization has
 
initiated the structure modifications by using banana stems to reduce the
 
outlet size. At the time of the study,the block officers have persuaded the
 
project office to modify the structure according to their needs and all the
 
outlets were 3-inch outlets except for the MD9 canal.
Cost of Irrigation to Farmers:Traditionally, irrigation water has been
 
supplied free to farmers in Sri Lanka. Attempts made by the government
 
in the past to levy a fee from farmers were largely unsuccessful(Samad
& Vermillion,1999:12). The“costs”of irrigation to farmers are primar-
Inadequate before project,adequate after project
 
Adequate before project,but inadequate after project
 
Inadequate water before and after the project
 
Adequate water before and after the project
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
32
 
8
 
6
 
4
 
23
 
3
 
10
 
11
 
4
 
Tail
 
end 
Middle 
Head
 
reach
(Percentage)
Table 6  Changes in Adequacy of Irrigation Water by the Project
 
Adequacy of Water Receipts
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ily the contribution of voluntary labor for canal maintenance and in some
 
instances,the payment made in kind to the“yaya palaka”(field supervi-
sor)employed by the Irrigation Department(ID)to oversee the distribu-
tion of irrigation water. With the introduction of participatory manage-
ment,the government expected FOs to recover the cost of“Operation and
 
Maintenance(O&M)”from farmers(Ratnayake,1995:71).
About 90 percent of farmers claimed that there was no cash fee on
 
irrigation. After the transfer of O& M functions to FOs,some organiza-
tions charged a modest fee(Rs 100/season or about US$1/season)for
 
canal maintenance. The survey results showed that only a minority of
 
farmers (23 percent) paid the maintenance fee. However, after the
 
rehabilitations through the project,none of the FOs’continues collecting
 
the fee.
Table 7 gives farmers’perception of changes in irrigation cost
 
components before and after the project. A majority of farmers claimed
 
that payments in kind and unpaid family labor contributions for canal
 
maintenance had remained about the same before and after the project.
Well-defined procedures for cost recovery have not been established as
 
yet.
It is interesting to note that prior to the rehabilitation project of the
 
left bank,most of the farmer organizations,haves collected a fee for the
 
specific purpose of maintenance requirements of the field canals. This
 
No response
 
Do not know
 
Same before and after project
 
Lower after project
 
Higher after project
 
2
 
0
 
0
 
98
 
0
 
2
 
3
 
7
 
81
 
7
 
Paid in kind Paid in Currency
 
Table 7  Farmers’Perception of Changes in Irrigation Costs
 
Condition
(Percentage)
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fund has been collected separate to the common membership fee. But
 
after the rehabilitation programme,these fund collection for the mainte-
nance of the canals has been abandoned. In farmer perception,the need
 
so far existed to maintain and repair the inlets,outlets,gates and other
 
structures of the canal,no longer exist since the resource are new and
 
been repaired and given to them by the rehabilitation project. Thus
 
contingency allocation requirements are not acute at the moment.
Therefore their responsibility in maintaining the field canals has been
 
limited to the cleaning of the canal bund and the surroundings through
 
shared labour. In their perception the responsibility of the distributary
 
canal maintenance still lies with the Mahaweli Authority, and any
 
requirement of the field canal,which would involve a large cost,would be
 
overseen by the Mahaweli Authority itself.
Quality of Irrigation Service: Introduction of participatory irrigation
 
management ought to result in an improvement in the irrigation service,
as farmers have a vested interest in the irrigation service,involving them
 
directly in irrigation management would lead to improvements in the
 
quality of the irrigation service. Changes in the quality of irrigation
 
service were assessed in terms of farmer perceptions on adequacy,timeli-
ness and fairness of water distribution, and the incidence of irrigation
-related conflicts among farmers before and after transfer??of O&M
 
responsibilities of the canals to farmer organizations. Table 8 and 9
 
displays farmers’perceptions about the quality of irrigation service
 
before and after transfer. A majority of farmers in both schemes claimed
10 The indicators specified by International Water Management Institution
(IWMI) to measure water supply conditions in irrigation schemes are:Relative
 
Irrigation Supply (RIS) and Relative Water Supply (RWS). These indicators
 
relate water supply to demand and indicate how tightly supply and demand are
 
matched(IWMI,1999:15). Water supply data were not available at the level of the
 
transfer unit (distributary canal)to calculate above indicators.
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that water supply in both the wet and dry seasons was adequate before
 
and after the transfer.
However, about one percent of the farmers in the head-reach and
 
about 12 percent in the middle and tail-end areas reported that water
 
supply had worsened after project. Farmers attributed the worsening of
 
water supply to the poor quality of work done during rehabilitation. The
 
responses of a majority of farmers with regard to the timeliness??of
 
water supply,fairness of distribution,and the frequency of conflicts over
 
water distribution,namely,that these had not changed significantly after
 
the project.
11 Whether water was released timely according to crop requirements.
Indicator
 
Table 8 Farmers’Perceptions on the Quality of Irrigation Service Before and After Project
 
Better after the project  
Worse after the project
 
Adequate before and after project
 
Inadequate before and after project
(Percentage)
0
 
0
 
4
 
0
 
2
 
5
 
0
 
0
 
2
 
52
 
8
 
1
 
55
 
4
 
2
 
55
 
4
 
2
 
0
 
2
 
10
 
1
 
2
 
8
 
1
 
2
 
8
 
15
 
5
 
3
 
17
 
3
 
1
 
22
 
3
 
1
 
Adequacy of water
 
supply
 
Fairness of water
 
distribution
 
Timeliness of water
 
distribution  Tail
 
Middle
 
Head
 
Tail
 
Middle
 
Head
 
Tail
 
Middle
 
Head
 
Indicator
 
Table 9  Frequency of Farmer Conflicts Before and After Project (Percentage)
Head  Middle  Tail
 
Frequency of farmer conflicts
 
16
 
7
 
2
 
18
 
5
 
12
 
3
 
12
 
3
 
12
 
3
 
7
 
Increased after project
 
Decreased after project
 
Infrequent after project
 
Frequent after project
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Operation and Maintenance of Canals:Farmer organizations bare the
 
responsibility of the conveyance system operation and maintenance at the
 
field canal level. With limited canal clearance,water-regulating struc-
tures in D canals were damaged intentionally or due to negligence. The
 
most common intentional damages observed during the field survey and
 
the motives of destructions are listed in Table 10. It is obvious that there
 
are three categories of farmers involved in destruction. The first cate-
gory is farmers who cultivate paddy land located below the D canal
 
command area,entirely dependent on either drainage water from paddy
 
lands or directly tapped water from the D canal. The second category is
 
the farmers in head end reach,who do not prefer measured and regulated
 
discharges and receive more than required. Third group is the farmers
 
from tail end reach,who are really effected from the actions of above two
 
categories.
Nature of Damage
 
Table 10 Intentional Damages of Hydraulic Structures Observed in D Canals
 
Responsible Party  Motive
 
Damage to field canal stil-
ling well weir and gauge
 
Farmers of head end  To prevent making accu-
rate discharge judgment
 
Damage to field canal(FC)
gates
 
Making holes in canal bank
 
Damage to the head drop
 
structures in D canal
 
Farmers with land
 
located below the FC
 
command area
 
Do
 
Farmers from tail end
 
To divert more water to
 
diversion structures or
 
directly to their land
 
Discharge water to drain-
age,divert water to their
 
lands
 
To deepen the D canal
 
bed,reduce the discharge
 
to head and middle FCs
 
Increase flow to their
 
land plots, make sure
 
they can access water
 
during short and intermit-
tent supply
 
Do Reopening old direct farm
 
outlets from D canals or
 
create new ones
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Irrigation Scheduling:The irrigation water releases are concentrated in
 
the cropping seasons??. Before the beginning of the cropping season the
 
MASL makes a water distribution calendar,based on the grown crops in
 
last season and the available water. The block offices provide the
 
necessary information to the Mahaweli Regional office,where the sched-
ule is made. Before the beginning of the irrigation season, there is a
 
meeting at the Mahaweli Regional office,with the participation of the
 
block offices, the farmer organizations and the farmers, called the
“Kanna Meeting”(Seasonal Meeting). This meeting aims to provide
 
opportunities to all the farmers to discuss their opinions relating to water
 
distribution in the area,with relevant officials. Besides a schedule for
 
irrigation water releases, there is a schedule for canal cleaning, land
 
preparation,sowing,harvesting,paying,etc. The irrigation schedule is a
 
rotation scheme of two weeks,in which water is provided to each field
 
canal for one or more following days. During the first month of the
 
irritation season,water is provided for land preparation. In this period
 
water is available continuously in the canals. The beginning of land
 
preparation is scattered. This means that two weeks after the first fields
 
were irrigated, the other fields start irrigation. As land preparation
 
requires large amounts of water the staggered timing prevents excessive
 
water demand at scheme level. It also facilitates access to land prepara-
tion machinery and labor. One month after the beginning of irrigation,
irrigation becomes rotational.
12 The words cropping season and off-season may be a bit confusing. Water needs
 
for rice are strictly seasonal, but bananas, which are nowadays promoted, need
 
water during the whole year. As a result,irrigation has changed to more year round
 
irrigation but still water supply is highly seasonal due to the high water needs for
 
rice cultivation and out of habit. Although the cropping season for bananas is year
 
round,the cropping season is still referred to as the cropping season for rice. Most
 
data on water released in all the canals is available for the cropping seasons for rice.
For the off-season however,data availability is very limited. The off-season seems
 
only of minor importance to the irrigation engineers.
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The pre-prepared plan for irrigation is adjusted every week accord-
ing to the recent water level data of the tank and rainfall. The project
 
office is giving its utmost effort to save some water during the cropping
 
season employing various strategies such as releasing water once in 15
 
days during off-season and for emergencies. There is however no strict
 
policy on how much water to conserve. In case of water scarcity the
 
Mahaweli Regional office will decide about the best strategy for each
 
case separately. They prioritize the need in water issues according to the
 
situation. If,at the end of the season,the choice is between saving the
 
crops by providing the remaining water of the reservoir and saving water,
priority is given to the crops. In 2000/2001 there was no water released
 
for crop cultivation in the Maha season because of lack of water stored
 
in the reservoirs. During this period there were water releases for
 
municipal water supply and domestic purposes. In Yala 2002 each farmer
 
was only allowed to cultivate 0.4 hectare of land out of the hectare they
 
own and the land preparation period was reduced to 15 days.
Progress of the plan prepared pre-seasonally for cultivation in Maha
 
2005/06 is illustrated in Figure 3. At the end of the season,activities for
 
cleaning and maintenance of the canals were almost 20 days behind the
 
target schedule. Thus the Mahaweli officers have to provide two addi-
tional discharges of water for the fields. The observations over the
 
progress of implementation of seasonal cultivation calendar indicate that
 
the canal clearing has been completed in only 40 percent of the canals.
According to the MASL officials,about 20 percent of the clearing was
 
done only after delaying the supply of initial irrigation demands??. Land
 
preparation progress had been very slow. The main reason given is that
 
no deadlines were informed to some farmers. According to the inter-
viewees,farmers of the head reach never hurry in their farming activities
 
as they have no water problem. They have the ability to maneuver their
13 This is a usual way to force farmers to clear canals
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cultivation plans without compromising irrigation water use. Since any
 
water discharges from the D canal has to go in the vicinity of their land,
they can take water to their lands compromising the tail end farmers??.
On the other hand, the tail end farmers who had not been assured of
 
reliable water supply do not see a need for strict adherence of the
 
seasonal plan. On the contrary, the farmers who depend on drainage
 
water for cultivation hurried in land preparations,because they have to be
 
complacent with what ever the water drained off from the main system.
This waywardness towards the cultivation planning exerts more pressure
 
on water management,as more irrigation water than initially planed has
 
Figure 3 Schedules of Farming Practices in Maha 2005/06
14 Within the Uda Walawe irrigation scheme there are big differences in water
 
availability. In general,in the upstream areas there is more water available than
 
in the downstream areas. The upstream areas are the first which are provided with
 
water after interruptions and also water for downstream areas passes through this
 
area which means that at least in the main canal there is water available. This
 
contributes to water availability upstream at the cost of water availability down-
stream. By the time the water arrives downstream the amount of water is not
 
always sufficient. Besides,it is easier to supply in the needs of the upstream areas
 
because the time between the decision and actual water allocation is shorter and
 
there are less uncertain circumstances. On a smaller scale the differences between
 
head end and tail end also exist on branch canal,distributary canal and field canal
 
level(Buysse,2002:12).
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to be released to the area. This compromises the water flow to the down
 
stream. Once the down stream extension area is operating in full capac-
ity,this would pose a greater threat of water scarcity for both farmers in
 
existing and extension area.
In the seasonal committee meetings, 3-month paddy varieties are
 
recommended,as to reduce the water requirement. The success of the
 
project heavily depends on adherence to this practice as water availability
 
to irrigate down stream extension area is justified by economizing the
 
water use in the upstream existing area, by using short term paddy
 
varieties and diversifying in to other crops??. It is remarkable that less
 
than one percent of the farmers have cultivated the recommended 3
-month paddy variety,while all the other farmers have cultivated 3.5
-months or 4-month varieties,delaying the growth period by further 2 to
 
3 weeks. Difficulties in marketing and lower market price for short-term
 
rice varieties have diverged farmers from the recommended practice.
These factors are disregarded in the seasonal planning, either due to
 
ignorance of officers or suppression by farmers. Demeanor of both
 
parties poses a treat to project success??.
15 In Udawalawe only 42% of the soils are suitable for paddy cultivation(Piyathila-
ke,2001:56). On all other fields paddy cultivation causes huge water losses due to
 
moderately or well-drained soils. Farmers in the region generally have a preference
 
for rice and may grow this even on the less suitable,well drained soils. Using basin
 
irrigation(flooding the fields),this leads to high water losses. The drainage water
 
or return flow can sometimes be used for irrigation downstream but often the better
 
drained soils are close to the river,so the percolation water is lost for irrigation.
The Udawalawe irrigation scheme is characterized by a relatively fast return flow
 
to the Udawalawe river(Buysse,2002:12).
16 Under the current water management regime,it is doubtful whether the system
 
has the capacity to meet the demands of these users (ADB, 1999:12) Irrigation
 
water use greatly exceeds design levels,particularly for rice production. This is
 
leading to reduced water flows in many areas,particularly to downstream areas and
 
farms near the end of the irrigation canals. The problem is particularly severe
 
during the dry season (April-September), but can also arise in the wet season
(ADB,1999:25)
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Law enforcement against farmers violating decisions made at culti-
vation meetings and rules and regulations related to the Operation and
 
Maintenance of the systems were handled by farmer leaders. Law
 
enforcement was easy in the past due to the existence of rural courts,and
 
farmers avoided free riding and violation of decisions taken at cultivation
 
meetings etc.,because they feared punishment(Jayakody et al.,2005:7).
With the abolition of rural courts,officers-in-charge at the MASL have
 
to sue the culprits at district courts once farmer representatives make
 
complaints to them,but it involves a long process. Therefore,there is a
 
tendency among the farmers to violate irrigation laws and cultivation
 
decisions at present.
?．Sustainability of the Project at the
 
Village Level
 
For the project to be sustainable,two main criteria have to be met by
 
the local community:first is the assumption of the maintenance responsi-
bilities of the canal system,at least at the field level by the final users;
and second is been efficient use of irrigation water in order to supply
 
adequate irrigation for the downstream extension areas. With the intro-
duction of the participatory irrigation management,the farmer organiza-
tions had assumed the responsibility of managing water issues and
 
maintenance of the field canals. But it is interesting to observe that with
 
the inception of the project,the farmer organizations in the locale have
 
withdrawn themselves from this liability. Farmer opinions of how the
 
canals should be developed had been taken into account and mid project
 
changes in construction of the canals had been carried out. Altering the
 
designs as perceived by the farmers as best suited for their needs,would
 
bestow a feeling of ownership of the resources and thereby a responsibil-
ity for the resources by the farmers. On the contrary, the farmer
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organizations,which had collected funds for the contingency maintenance
 
requirements of the canals so far,have also abandoned the practice. As
 
the resources provided are new and by Japanese assistance,the need for
 
a financial endowment by themselves is perceived to be not acute. In their
 
opinion,at the moment labour contributions for the maintenance of the
 
canals by cleaning them twice a season is more than adequate. Larger
 
repairs will not occur in the near future;as if it does the MASL would
 
oversee to it,as the money is coming form a foreign aid. As mentioned
 
above,for 66 percent of the farmers,the word“foreign aid”meant a grant
 
from the foreign government,in this case‘Japan’. Only one third of the
 
farmers were aware of the fact that the Japanese assistance received has
 
to be recovered by the project benefits and paid back in the future. This
 
dependency on the authorities for pecuniary requirements is not good in
 
the context of sustainability of the resources. As mentioned in the
 
chapter five,the MASL is also curtailing as a result of financial restric-
tions of the government. Thus the bureaucracies whom the farmers are
 
relying on will not be able to maintain the resources effectively in the
 
near future.
On the other hand, the farmers in the existing areas were not well
 
informed about the overall affect of the project. With the continuation of
 
current farming practices,even the farmers in the tail end of the canals
 
in the existing areas are facing water scarcities. It is unquestionable that
 
the system will not have the capacity to irrigate the extension areas as
 
well. Under the crop diversification programmes, the area has been
 
successful in converting some of the farmers in to banana cultivators,
reducing the demand for irrigation water compared to paddy farming.
But with the failure of the authorities to ensure markets, it has been
 
unable to meet the targets of converting paddy farmers into Other Field
 
Crop(OFC)cultivation. In the face of higher marketing risk the farmers
 
had turned on to the lowest risk available, paddy farming using the
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techniques they have used and mastered so far. Thus, new cultivation
 
practices resulting efficient use of irrigation water is sporadic. Inade-
quacy in only some parts of the system,would lead to sabotage of the
 
irrigation resources by the affected parties,namely tail end farmers and
 
down stream farmers. The best approach to control sabotaging is
 
through farmer organizations, where the cost of monitoring is lower.
However,as has discussed earlier,peer farmers and farmer leaders are
 
not taking strict actions as they perceive water scarcity as a dire problem
 
and as each and every farmer has to devise their well being somehow,it
 
is of one way in achieving this.
?．Concluding Remarks
 
The irrigation system has operated effectively in the existing areas
 
but with improvements in irrigation efficiency much below design. Water
 
demand at the upstream of the system is similar to pre project levels
 
despite a rapid increase in non rice crops with low irrigation require-
ments. While many issues influenced actual outcomes,three interrelated
 
factors played important roles:first, lack of integrated implementation
 
practices among the responsible organizations; second, unanticipated
 
events such as encroachment of lands,that were not promptly addressed;
and third,unrealistic expectations of farmers on water availability and
 
officials on water use efficiencies.
The consultancy company has designed the project as such that the
 
canal shape, size in addition to the number and place of outlets in a
 
distributary canal increase the water utilization efficiencies at field
 
levels, facilitating the successful accomplishment of project objectives.
The MASL regional officials,as well as the NGO called“World Vision”
have acted on the request of farmers,without proper consultancies with
 
the project office and consultants,in modifying the irrigation canal and
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outlet designs. This has enabled farmers to continue their current irriga-
tion practices of excessive use of water, threatening the viability of
 
providing irrigation facilities to the extension areas. The situation could
 
have been easily modified, if proper communication networks had been
 
established among the implementation agencies involved in the area,
clarifying the objectives and prerequisites of the project.
Moreover, the rehabilitations of main irrigation canals in the up-
stream existing areas were completed before planning began for down-
stream development. This has led to a massive migration of encroachers
 
to the area. The interaction between project planning and the encroa-
chers has irreversibly changed the course of development in the area. The
 
encroachers are not willing to shift from their acquired lands,but benefits
 
from irrigation water in the LB main canal,exerting additional demand
 
for irrigation water than intended to supply to the area originally.
Expectations of farmers along with assumptions in project planning
 
has bee unrealistic in nature. Estimated benefits for successive phases of
 
development in original plans assumes that farmers would diversify into
 
cropping systems other than paddy and reduce water use in paddy cultiva-
tion. However,farmers anticipating better irrigation facilities along with
 
the rehabilitation of the canals,continued to cultivate rice varieties that
 
require large amounts of water. Because rice remains the staple crop,
virtually all farmers seek to grow sufficient rice to meet their domestic
 
needs regardless of the suitability of their soils(ADB,1999:17).
The development of the extension area seemed unwarranted by the
 
very high amount of water used in the existing area. The second phase
 
of the project was implemented before management was brought in line
 
with accepTablestandards to meet the needs of the area. The new project
 
did not depart much, in its style from top-down, engineer-oriented
 
projects with the design, settlement processes and economic feasibility
 
dependent upon assumptions of cropping patterns,practices and produc-
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tivity that had been ad hoc and unrealistic in the past. The evidence
 
suggests that participatory irrigation management entails a partial
 
devolution of decision making authority to farmers. The main concern of
 
the government has been on setting up of farmer organizations. This
 
initiative has apparently improved communication between farmers and
 
agency personnel, and has fostered farmer participation in decision
 
making to some extend. Yet,government intervention at the level of the
 
transfer unit remains strong. There is general confusion and controversy
 
about the responsibility transfers. First,there is no well-defined process
 
for the transfer of responsibilities of the field canals. Second, there is
 
strong disagreement about responsibilities of maintenance of the field
 
canals. Many farmers oppose full transfer of responsibility for mainte-
nance of distributary channels to Farmer Organizations on the grounds
 
that the farmers cannot afford it. Although hand over is supposed to
 
mean that Farmer Organizations have full operational and maintenance
 
responsibilities for their canals, the MASL continues providing govern-
ment funds to the Farmer Organizations. This has conveyed an unclear
 
message to farmers of their responsibility over the maintenance of canals.
One of the major issues of the project is its sustainability in the
 
future. Extravagant irrigation water use,practiced before the project is
 
currently continuing. Water shortages are increasingly in evidence.
Partly in response,many farmers have destroyed outlet and structures on
 
branch and distributary canals, exacerbating water distribution and
 
management problems. Unless corrected, these modifications have the
 
potential to seriously damage the system capacity. There is increasing
 
evidence that under current usage patterns, the Walawe River water
 
resources are not sufficient to support the full proposed development of
 
irrigation(ADB,1999:25). Provision of irrigation facilities at no cost to
 
farmers, combined with limited farmer participation in designing, has
 
resulted in low levels of system ownership. In turn,this has contributed
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to widespread damage to structures and water wastage. It is essential for
 
project sustainability that the destruction be reversed and water use
 
limited in the near future,if the irrigation system is to continue to operate
 
effectively. The existing informal institutions in the locale are not strong
 
enough to wield sanctions to control these improper practices. Unless
 
strong action is taken, the problem is likely to spread rapidly as the
 
scheme managers become less able to maintain planned water flows in
 
branch canals and distributary canals.
The institutional environment in the area,both formal and informal,
has not been fully compatible with the assumptions of the project design.
Inefficiencies in the formal institutions and relaxations of informal insti-
tutions have driven encroachment of land resources and inefficient water
 
usage in the area,threatening the sustainability of the project.
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